Elements of Hearing in Revocation of Parole
Proceedings* In re Tate 1 recently held that right to counsel in revocation-ofparole proceedings was mandatory, despite the fact that recommitment was by an administrative rather than a judicial tribunal. The parolee's right to present evidence and adduce witnesses was also held mandatory. The applicable District of Columbia statute 2 provided for an "opportunity to appear" before revocation. The court deduced: "opportunity to appear" necessarily demands recognition of the right to a hearing; 3 this requires the right to both counsel and presentation of evidence; 4 with these rights denied, the statute was violated, and a writ of habeas corpus would issue.
5 Constitutional basis for the decision was denied.
The right to a hearing in revocation-of-parole cases has long been litigated. 6 Apparently it was recognized at common law. 7 Although it has been held an element of constitutional due process under state decisions, 8 some finding a violation of both federal and state constitutions, 9 3 This is by no means a necessary conclusion. "'Appearance' in the law has several significations, and the word must always be understood in reference to the particular . . . subject matter to which it relates. In some cases it means to appear in person; in others by attorney" (italics supplied). Pope: Legal Definitions, Chicago; Callaghan and Co., 1919. Only one early case, Dundee Mortgage Trust Investment Co. v. Charlton, Sheriff, etc., 32 Fed. 192 (D.C. Ore., 1887), may be cited on this point: "The right 'to appear' before a tribunal.., implies the right to be heard. thereabout; so far, at least, as the party is 'interested.'" 4 The court apparently regarded the right to a hearing and the right to counsel as independent. This view is sustained by the Constitutional Amendments. It was the view expressed in State ex rel. Charles v. Port Commissioners of New Orleans, 159 La: 70, 105 So. 228 (1925): "We think the right to be heard is one thing, and the right to be assisted by counsel is quite another thing." Since, however, the parolee's rights here came under statute, there is little basis for finding any right to counsel except as such a right inheres in the hearing prescribed by that statute.
5 The order of the court was stayed for a reasonable time to allow In addition to express statutory sanction of summary revocation, many ,courts have denied the right to a hearing because a provision in the parolee's release statement has stipulated summary revocation; 14 this is the "contract' approach. 15 Other courts have revoked paroles without a hearing on a "constructive custody" concept. 16 Where the applicable statutes deal with the right only by implication, the duty of determining the existence of the right has fallen to the courts. Theirs has likewise been the task of determining the elements of the hearing.
In those revocation-of-parole cases where a hearing has been sanctioned, either expressly 17 or by judicial implication, 18 the elements necessary are shadowy in outline. There would seem to be a general requirement of orderly procedure, 19 and a right of the aecused to be present at the hearing, at least personally.
20
There is a right to a jury trial if the, question of identity of the person to be recommitted is involved.
21 -The rights to counsel, to present evi- dence, and to adduce witnesses have been granted. 22 The full requirements of a judicial hearing, including the right to counsel, the right to produce evidence, the right to cross-examine, the right to findings, and to an appeal from findings, 2 3 are decreed infrequently. The more general trend is to preserve only those elements which the applicable statute's background and purpose demand_ 24 Proper recognition of the character of administrative action supports this view. 25 Under the federal act covering pardon and parole, 2 6 a hearing before a district court, acting in an administrative rather than a judicial capacity, is expressly granted. The Supreme Court in Burns v. United States 27 gave the general outline of individual guarantees in such a hearing. 28 The Burns case concerned a defendant who violated parole by unduly absenting himself from jail, where he was confined for another crime, permission having been granted for him to be absent when necessary for dental treatment. Upon complaint of summary proceedings to recommit, the Court said, 24 Much depends on the person or agency revoking. If complete power is placed in the giver of the pardon, ordinarily the governor, courts are willing to find more rights in more hearings. "Statutes are not directory when to put them in-that category would result in serious impairment of the public or the private interests that they were intended to protect. eral cases 32 construing the same statute 33 that seems to read limitations into the hearing requirement. The necessity of further safeguards is implied. These cases, perhaps more in point for support of the principal case, were ignored by-it.
Here the court relied most heavily on Escoe v. Zerbst, 3 4 where a criminal was arrested and returned to jail without a hearing of any kind, in direct violation of the mandate of the federal statute that he "be forthwith taken before the court." There is little parallel with the principal case, where a timely hearing 3 5 was given before the parole board. There are passages in the Escoe case broad enough and narrow enough 36 -depending upon the viewpoint-to sustain a determination either way on the questions of counsel, the presentation of evidence, and the right to witnesses:" .
Under state parole statutes, some decisions have clearly: ruled on elements of a revocation hearing.
3 7 There has been the same general .outline as appeared in the federal cases. 35 Ordinarily, however, stte courts have merely sanctioned a lower court's procedure, and have refrained from holding any particular elements necessary. The right to counsel, to produce evidence, and to adduce witnesses have all been recognized in this manner. Since, in almost half the states, a hearing itself is not mandatory in revocation-of-parole cases, 40 and in others the hearing granted may be summary in character, 41 this decision could be regarded as burdening the District of Columbia parole statute with a hearing whose elements were beyond legislative intent. Statutes covering revocation procedures were enacted against a background of "full bearing" already recognized; 42 their primary significance is in the extent to which they change pre-existing procedures. Moreover, these statutes commonly provide for commissions and boards com-
